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Abstract—Accurate time synchronisation is a key requirement
for control and automation protocols with (near) real time
requirements such as the IEC 60870-5-104 and 61850 family
of standards relying on IP transport, and also represents an
attractive attack vector against power systems. We propose a
modelling and analytical technique based on queueing theory
and study model the behaviour of both protocol standard families
for deliberately limited, weak adversaries. We demonstrate the
efficacy of the model by identifying a way of undermining
measurement and control signal QoS whilst remaining compliant
with standards merely by varying inter-arrival rates of legitimate
traffic, resulting in de-synchronisation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safe and efficient operation of smart grids (SG), control
systems and intelligent electronic devices (IED) requires a
reliable common time reference for sensors, actuators, and
control logic. This is required to allow monitoring systems
to determine causality, for monitoring a network or power
system’s quality, and to co-ordinate control actions as well
as to operate safety mechanisms correctly. Moreover, such
synchronisation is also critical for the detection of incidents
and attacks in the reconstruction of events. However, these
functions require different levels of precision and accuracy.
A single local reference may suffice in trivial cases, but
for larger expanses and distributed systems, multiple time
references are required. Here, GNSS receivers are widely used,
potentially in conjunction with terrestrial support systems to
enhance accuracy. Such systems, however, are not feasible to
be deployed indiscriminately for individual IEDs and compo-
nents since e.g. placement of antennae and line of sight to
sufficient constellations are not always optimal. Moreover, it
is anticipated that future smart grid deployment may include
heterogeneous systems not on a single time reference.
Both the IEC 61850 [1] and IEC 60870-5-104 [2] standards
explicitly make reference to the IETF Network Time Protocol
(NTP) [3], which is reviewed in section II. Whilst the IETF
has made efforts to secure NTP with RFC7384 [4], most
implementations of the standard remain unsecured. There
have been various different attacks that have been theorised
for both NTP and the precision time protocol (PTP), which
will be explored in section III. A compromise of the time
synchronisation can easily affect the functionality and security
of the entire power network as it allows for both attacks and
obfuscation of attacks.
The first contribution of this paper are the demonstration of
a de-synchronisation attack against the accuracy of both the
IEC 60870-5 and IEC 61850 protocols’ time synchronisation
control/master servers, shown by a limited adversary’s ability
to manipulates the rate of packets arriving from different
stratum NTP servers acting as the control/master servers time
source, to ensure that the target IED receives packets with
inappropriate accuracy. This attack is possible against com-
pliant implementations since transitions between NTP time
sources are not explicitly captured in the respective standards
(cf. sec. II), ultimately not considering the arisal of edge cases
in supporting protocols. The second contribution lies in the
formal modelling of the attack to offer resource requirement
boundaries. For this attack, described in section V, we expand
upon earlier work on queueing network models for modelling
particularly time and ordering-based attacks against real-time
protocols; we briefly describe the approach in section IV.
II. IEC60870 & IEC61850 TIME SYNCHRONISATION
The IEC 60870-5 and IEC 61850 power system automation
standards describe requirements of the telecontrol equipment
and data objects that will be used to automate power systems.
Each standard defines the accuracy of the time source required
for an IED to perform its function. Below is a brief descrip-
tion of the time synchronisation communication models in
each standard. While IEC60870-5 (-101) can rely on implicit
time synchronisation based on synchronous communication,
the adaptation to wide-area Internet Protocol communication
architecture means that IEDs must connect to dedicated time
source. The IEC 60870-5-104 standard hence provides two
different time synchronisation models. The first is the synchro-
nisation process between a control server and its client server,
and the second is synchronisation based on a calculation and
dissemination of the transmission delay between servers. The
first process is a simple call-response protocol, with the client
device’s clock updating when the control server receives an
affirmative reply from it. The standard requires clients to be
able to reply to the control server for the operation to be
valid but does not state a preferred time source for the control
server to reference. The only integrity check client performs
is if the synchronisation process is completed later than the
client expects. If this occurs, it flags any operation it performs
after completion as potentially inaccurate until its clock is
updates again. The standard neglects to state what happens to
the flagged messages. The time delay synchronisation method
is another call and response process. During the call and
response, the control server calculates the time delay between
the two devices as
td =
rdt− (sdt+ tr)
2
(1)
where td is the time delay, rdt is the round trip time, sdt is the
time that the client synchronizes to, and tr is the time it takes
for the client to reply. Once the control server has completed
this operation, it forwards the delay to the client it has
synchronised with. The time synchronisation communication
model described in the IEC61850 standard is minimal in its
description. It gives an overview of how time synchronisation
occurs between a dedicated time server and a substation and
requires a multicast protocol to tell the client IEDs what the
new time is, but does not specify how an authoritative time
is sourced from a wide-area communication network. The
standard defers to either GNSS or the simplified NTP protocol
as possible time sources, but it does not elaborate on how
they interface with the network or how the correct precision
is achieved. The only information explicitly called for is that
the time server needs to update at a set time interval, specified
level of accuracy, and to not exceed a time limit before the
next update. Although not explicitly declared, the elapsed time
is used to calculate the transmission delay between the time
server and its clients. The time server can use multicast to
complete the synchronisation operation with its client IEDs.
III. RELATED WORK
We briefly review related applications of queueing theory
model in security analysis and also touch upon related work
on securing of time synchronisation protocols.
A. Queueing Theory
Queuing theory’s principal use in security research has been
to analyse denial of service (DoS) attacks. It is a suitable
formalism for this type of attack as DoS scenarios can be
modelled without much abstraction. Most of the research
describes various packet level scenarios with either a single
M/M/1 queue or an open Jackson network, which is a
network of M/M/1 queues [5]. Relying on M/M/1 limits
what the user can discern from their models, as a queue
of this type can hold an infinite number of objects. Given
this underlying assumption, all that can be discerned from
these models is the degradation of the systems performance. It
doesn’t tell the user at what point the system being modelled
will fail to meet its availability objective.
Xiao-Yu et al. [6] used a M/M/c/K queue to investigate SIP
INVITE request flooding scenario. Their solution is to create
a queue that deals only with INVITE requests, while Kammas
et al. [7] created an open Jackson network of M/M/1 queues
to model virus propagation across a network. Their state
space included the internal transitions of state of each node,
as well as the global state of the network. Wang et al. [8]
developed a mathematical framework, using embedded two
dimensional Markov chains, to allow the user to use different
probability distribution functions for acceptance rates. Their
model also allows for the separate analysis of the malicious
message properties from the normal traffic’s. Previously we
used queuing theory to demonstrate different types of attacks,
other than DoS and demonstrated a de-synchronisation attack
against the control communication model in IEC 61850 [1].
This demonstrated that by altering the rate of arrival of a
certain type of message into the servers state machine, the
likelihood of server time-out can be increased, resulting in
client-server de-synchronisation as the server doesn’t declare
that it has timed out [9].
Another class of attacks we have explored is injection attacks,
where queuing theory allows quantification of the probability
of success of injection attacks against the GOOSE communi-
cation model. In this work we used a single M/M/1/K to
look at the requirements that an adversary would have to meet
to for their injection attack to be successful [10].
B. Time Synchronisation Security
Itkin & Wool [11], Gaderer et al. [12], and Malhotra &
Goldberg [13] previously performed analyses on vulnerabil-
ities of the NTP/PTP protocol with a taxonomy of various
attack vectors that would allow the adversary to control the
network. Each taxonomy proposes countermeasures, such as
introducing the confidentiality, integrity, and authentication
triad into this domain and basing the protocol on the P2P
network paradigm. Particularly relevant for the work described
here, Ullmann and Vögeler [14] performed an analysis on the
consequence of a delay attack against both the NTP and PTP
protocols. They showed that a delay in a sync message would
affect all the client clocks, and a delay request message would
only affect the client that sent the message. As a mitigation,
Ullmann and Vögeler proposed a cryptographic hash on the
protocol to mitigate these attacks. Tsang & Beznosov [15]
created a qualitative taxonomy of attacks against the PTP
protocol. They laid out how an adversary could potentially
misuse certain messages in the protocol to create undesir-
able affects, while suggesting countermeasures for most of
them. Mizrahi [16] developed some game theoretic strategies
to prevent delay attacks against NTP. Malhotra et al. [17]
demonstrated that NTP’s “kiss-o-death” packet can be used
to DoS any client on the NTP network, denying it the ability
to synchronise. There has also been research on how the NTP
protocol can be used to generate distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks. Czyz et al. [18] performed an analysis of
DDoS on the internet that were achieved using unsecured NTP
servers, seeing substantial increases of these kinds of attacks
between 2013 and 2014. The increase was due to adversaries
realising that NTP’s monlist diagnostic command could be
used as a work factor amplification attack vector.
Moussa et al. [19] produced a detailed analysis of the
consequences of a delay attack in a smart grid substation
environment, also elaborating a model for mitigation and
countering such delay attacks. The authors are not aware of
further formal analyses of the security properties of either the
NTP or PTP beyond these somewhat qualitative results.
IV. QUEUING THEORY
Whilst queuing theory has been used to model DoS attacks,
as shown in section III, we have proposed a formalism
expanding the available semantics. We rely on a M/M/1/K
queue network and have chosen this because it can be used
to offer expanded semantics over the M/M/1 queue model
found in the literature as it imposes a finite queue length K.
This means when the queue is full, it will no longer accept
any packets. More importantly, it allows us to model other
attacks against availability, such as work factor amplification,
and de-synchronisation. These are principal QoS/security goals
promises of a SG, as an IED losing it state or being effectively
removed from the network could make parts of the grid unsafe.
Using a M/M/1/K network offers the versatility of being
able to model different layers of abstraction of the system,
as it can be set up to represent the flow of packets over the
communications network as well as the semantics of a protocol
run within an IED. When the formalism is used to describe
the semantic flow of runs, each queue represents a state in
the state machine of the device. The description given below
hence focuses on the assumptions and set0up for semantic
flow protocol runs. Our model adapts the work of Osorio &
Bierlaire [20], which describes the state of an individual queue
in a M/M/c/K network, to describe the global state of the
network. Each queue obeys the FIFO discipline for processing
packets, and if the queue is blocked it uses the blocked-at-
service discipline. The state space of the ordering of packets
in a individual queue on the network is
I = {(ti, ..., tk)) ∈ {Empty,Regular,Malicious}k}. (2)
The first step that the formalism must do is calculate the
parameters that govern how each queue in the network per-
forms. To do this the user must set up a series of exogenous
parameters for each node. These are
• Ki: The maximum capacity of each queue.
• µi: The service rate of each queue
• γi: The external arrival rate to a queue, if it is at the
starting edge of the network.
• φ(i, 1): The average number of distinct target queues that
are blocking a job at each queue. If a queue is at the
concluding edge of the network this term is not required.
A method for approximating this value is given in Osorio
& Bierlaire [20].
• pij The probability of packet transitioning from queue i
to queue j once processed.
Once these have been set, the rest of the endogenous
variables of the queue can be solved using the
following set of non-linear simultaneous equations.
Endogenous variable Equation
Probability Queue Full P (Ni = Ki) =
(1−ρi)ρ
Ki
i
1−ρKi+1i
is Full
Arrival Rate λi =
λeffi
1−P (Ni=Ki)
Effective Arrival Rate λeffi = γi(1− P (Ni = Ki))
+
∑
j pjiλ
eff
j
Probability Queue Pi =
∑
j pijP (Nj = Kj)
is Blocked
Common Acceptance rate 1
µ̃ai
=
∑
j∈I+
λeffj
λeffi µ
eff
j
Effective service rate 1
µeffi
= 1µi
+ Pi
µ̃ai φ(i,1)
where ρi = λiµeffi
. Once all of the queues parameters have
been discerned, a transition rate matrix Q can be generated
for the transitions between all the possible states of the
queuing network. There are two types of state transition, a
queue can participate in a packet transmission, or a queue
can send/receive a packet from outside the network. Q is
then used in to find the steady state vector for this continuous
time Markov chain. The requirements of the steady state
vector are independence of time and initial state vector. The
steady state vector allows for the calculation of the marginal
probabilities for the specific queue as
π(ti) =
∑
s∈I
π(t1, ..., tk). (3)
which gives the probability that a node has k packets in
it. From this various performance metrics for the individual
queues within the network can be calculated, including the
global throughput of the network.
V. NTP ATTACK
We now describe a de-synchronisation attack based on the
queue model, presenting an adversary model before exempli-
fying the type of vulnerability studied in the form of disrupting
the accuracy of time synchronisation of a master (control
server) by forcing it to synchronise against an inappropriate
time reference source without detecting or mitigating this
event. We note that this class of attacks is effective against
both the IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 standards since both
leave the same gap in their respective requirements definition
as discussed in section II.
A. Adversary Model
The adversary for the attack is a weaker form of Dolev
& Yao’s [21] symbolic model. Our adversary can manipulate
the processing rate of packets of different NTP synchroni-
sation server’s queues, but can’t modify the communication
or endpoints. This maps to them being able change the rate
of packets travelling across a communication channel. This
attack can be carried out even with RFC7384 [4] implemented
Stratum 1start
Stratum 2start
Control server
µreg
µmal
Fig. 1. The network topography used in this attack. The NTP servers are on
different strata, and the adversary manipulates the arrival rate of the packets
from the them to the control/master server.
across the network, as they don’t need to manipulate the
content of the packet. The adversary doesn’t attack the servers
themselves. The channels are represented as arrows in Fig.
1. It should be noted that the adversary needs to be able to
internally synchronise information and commands between the
adversary’s taps on the communication channels available; in
this paper we assume that this is the case and do not model
this explicitly.
B. Accuracy Synchronisation Attack
IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 IEDs require different
levels of accuracy for the different functions that they perform.
From power measurements (∼ 1µs) to logging (∼ 100ms)
[22], IED and SCADA systems require a time source with the
appropriate accuracy for their functions. If the IED is either
solely dependant on an NTP network, or is unable to connect
to another time source (GNSS satellite, PTP, etc), then it must
be able to select a NTP stratum with an appropriate accuracy
[23]. We assume that a given power network holds more than
one NTP server, typically at different strata, for reliability
reasons. Neither of the state machines in IEC 60870-5-5 or
IEC 61850-7-2 check if the accuracy of the time source they
are connecting to is appropriate the function required, nor
do they have any correction procedure if an inadequate level
of accuracy is chosen. This oversight provides an adversary
with an attack vector that can undermine the functionality of
IEDs on the network. This attack vector exists because, as
stated in section II, neither standards incorporate sub-protocols
on how to handle NTP state transitions that will cause the
control/master server to violate the QoS requirements. The
standards presume that all time sources will always provide the
current time with the correct accuracy, which is not the case
with NTP: Each NTP stratum provides a different accuracy.
The premise of this attack is for the adversary to manipulate
the rate of packets arriving from the NTP server from the stra-
tum with correct accuracy (e.g. by interfering with legitimate
communication), stratum 1, to increase the probability that the
control/master server will connect to an NTP server with an
inappropriate accuracy, stratum 2. The adversary manipulates
the the traffic of the communication channels serving the
control/master server, which may e.g. be achieved by a Man-
in-the-Middle or Man-on-the-Side attack not elaborated here.
Fig. 2. Maximum probability of the control server queue being full of
malicious packets given the adversary’s manipulation of the ratio of arrival
rates of packets from the different NTP servers from different stratums.
The simplified network topology used to demonstrate this
attack is shown in Fig. 1. In this model, malicious packets
are defined as packets with inappropriate time accuracy. We
obtain the effective arrival rate in each queue (eqs.4,5)
λeffstratum 1,2 = γstratum 1,2(1− P (Nstratum 1,2=Kstratum 1,2)) (4)
λeffcontrol = γstratum 1(1− P (Nstratum 1=Kstratum 1)) (5)
+γstratum 2(1− P (Nstratum 2=Kstratum 2))
The λeffcontrol is the sum of the previous two λ
eff as all of there
packets can only go into the control server. The probability of
the queues being blocked are
Pstratum 1,2 = P (Ncontrol = Kcontrol) (6)
Pcontrol = 0 (7)
The common acceptance rate for the stratum 1 & 2, queues,
equation 6, are
1
˜µastratum 1,2
=
λeffcontrol
λeffstratum 1,2µcontrol
(8)
whilst
µ̃acontrol = 0 (9)
From the above equations the endogenous equations can
then be derived. We have conducted a simulation of the attack
outlined; this simulation attack shows that adversary only
needs to create a ratio of 20 times the difference in processing
rates of the two servers for the probability of the success of
the attack to approach certainty. The authors could not find
any second order affects in the simulation. We hypothesised
that with a sufficiently large difference in processing rate, the
probability of the stratum 1 being blocked would increase, but
no correlation was seen. The authors would like to stress that
this work attacks a different part of the time-keeping system
than the work of Barreto et al. [24]. Their attack focuses on
disrupting the use of the communication channel between the
IED control/master server and the IED slave servers within
the distribution network, which are defined in the standards.
The work presented here, however, focuses on attacks against
the communication channel between the IED control/master
server and potential time sources.
VI. CONCLUSION
We demonstrated a class of de-synchronisation attacks
against power network control and monitoring systems com-
pliant with the IEC 60870-5 and IEC 61850 use of time
synchronisation systems with minimal strength adversaries
based on our novel queueing model for protocols. We have
demonstrated that an adversary can undermine the protocol
by forcing the use of insufficient NTP servers only by ma-
nipulating the rate of arriving packtets from the different
NTP servers to increase the probability that the control/master
server connects to an inappropriate time source. This attack
was demonstrated using an extension of a queuing network
approach developed by the authors in previous work. This
attack vector exists because the state machines of the standards
do not adequately take into account how valid NTP actions can
cause undesirable states to occur in an IED’s state machines. If
the adversary successful implemented this class of attack, they
could disrupt e.g. the state estimation of a transmission or dis-
tribution network, which could lead to the mis-application of
protective action [25]; moreover, we also note that such actions
also render auditing and monitoring for intrusion detection
problematic as time-stamps ordering of events cannot be relied
upon. Future work includes continued development of the
queuing theory approach demonstrated here by expanding the
expressiveness of the model as appropriate to capture certain
classes of attacks. This is then to be applied to the various state
machines found in the respective IEC 60870 and IEC 61850
standards which include modes of operation for dealing with
unacceptable accuracy and failure to connect to a time source.
The aim is to demonstrate using the queuing network approach
that the resulting state machines are either resilient to the
various classes of NTP attacks or to develop suitable resilience
mechanisms that do not violate the standards’ quality of
service requirements.
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[14] M. Ullmann and M. Vögeler, “Delay Attacks: Implication on NTP and
PTP Time Synchronization,” in Proceedings of the 2009 International
Symposium on Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement, Con-
trol and Communication (ISPCS 2009). Brescia, Italy: IEEE Press,
Oct. 2009, pp. 1–6.
[15] J. Tsang and K. Beznosov, “A security analysis of the precise time
protocol (short paper),” in Information and Communications Security,
P. Ning, S. Qing, and N. Li, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 50–59.
[16] T. Mizrahi, “A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks against time syn-
chronization protocols,” in IEEE International Symposium on Precision
Clock Synchronization for Measurement, Control and Communication,
2012, Sept 2012, pp. 1–6.
[17] A. Malhotra, I. E. Cohen, E. Brakke, and S. Goldberg, “Attacking the
network time protocol,” in 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2016.
[18] J. Czyz, M. Kallitsis, M. Gharaibeh, C. Papadopoulos, M. Bailey, and
M. Karir, “Taming the 800 pound gorilla: The rise and decline of
ntp ddos attacks,” in Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet
Measurement Conference, ser. IMC ’14. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2014, pp. 435–448.
[19] B. Moussa, M. Debbabi, and C. Assi, “A detection and mitigation model
for PTP delay attack in a smart grid substation,” in IEEE International
Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2015,
Nov 2015, pp. 497–502.
[20] C. Osorio and M. Bierlaire, “An analytic finite capacity queueing
network model capturing the propagation of congestion and blocking
,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 196, no. 3, pp. 996
– 1007, 2009.
[21] D. Dolev and A. Yao, “On the Security of Public Key Protocols,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 198–208, Mar
1983.
[22] S. Rinaldi, D. D. Giustina, P. Ferrari, A. Flammini, and E. Sisinni, “Time
synchronization over heterogeneous network for smart grid application:
Design and characterization of a real case,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 50,
pp. 41 – 57, 2016.
[23] D. L. Mills, Computer Network Time Synchronization: The Network Time
Protocol on Earth and in Space, Second Edition, 2nd ed. Boca Raton,
FL, USA: CRC Press, Inc., 2010.
[24] S. Barreto, A. Suresh, and J. Y. L. Boudec, “Cyber-attack on packet-
based time synchronization protocols: The undetectable delay box,” in
2016 IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology
Conference Proceedings, May 2016, pp. 1–6.
[25] S. B. Andrade, M. Pignati, G. Dan, M. Paolone, and J. Y. L. Boudec,
“Undetectable PMU Timing-Attack on Linear State-Estimation by Using
Rank-1 Approximation,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, pp. 1–1,
2017.
